Techniques for using signed nonces to secure cloud shells

ABSTRACT

Techniques for using signed nonces to secure cloud shells are provided. The techniques include receiving, by a session manager service, a request to connect a user device to a secure connection to a secure shell instance. The session manager service may authorize the user device to access the secure shell instance and may configure the secure shell instance, being described by a shell identifier of the secure shell instance. The techniques also include generating, by the session manager service, a nonce token and providing the shell identifier, and a router address of the secure shell router to the user device. The techniques also include generating, by the session manager service, a signed nonce token using the nonce token; and providing the signed nonce token and the shell identifier to a user device.

CROSS-REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. Non-Provisional applicationSer. No. 16/993,970, filed Aug. 14, 2020, entitled “TECHNIQUES FOR USINGSIGNED NONCES TO SECURE CLOUD SHELLS,” which is related to U.S.Non-Provisional application Ser. No. 16/993,973, filed on Aug. 14, 2020,entitled “TECHNIQUES FOR UTILIZING MULTIPLE NETWORK INTERFACES FOR ACLOUD SHELL,” and U.S. Non-Provisional application Ser. No. 17/078,835,filed on Oct. 23, 2020, entitled “TECHNIQUES FOR PERSISTING DATA ACROSSINSTANCES OF A CLOUD SHELL,” the disclosures of which are incorporatedby reference in their entirety for all purposes.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Cloud-based platforms provide scalable and flexible computing resourcesfor users. Such cloud-based platforms, also referred to asinfrastructure as a service (IaaS), may offer entire suites of cloudsolutions around a customer's data, for example, solutions for authoringtransformations, loading data, and presenting the data. IaaS systems mayimplement security protocols to protect against unauthorized access touser data.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Techniques are provided (e.g., a method, a system, non-transitorycomputer-readable medium storing code or instructions executable by oneor more processors) for securing cloud shells to run one or moreterminals, using signed nonces in coordination with one or moreadditional security operations.

In a first aspect, a method includes receiving, by a session managerservice, a request to connect a user device to a secure connection to asecure shell instance, authorizing, by a session manager service, theuser device; configuring, by the session manager service, the secureshell instance being described by a shell identifier of the secure shellinstance, generating, by the session manager service, a nonce token,signing, by the session manager service, the nonce token to generate asigned nonce token, and providing, by the session manager service, thesigned nonce token, the shell identifier, and a router address to theuser device.

In an example authorizing the user device includes receiving a logintoken comprising a user identifier from the user device, requesting anauthorization system public key from an authorization service,authenticating the user device based at least in part on decrypting thelogin token with the authorization system public key, requesting adelegation token from the authorization service at least in part byproviding the user identifier, a resource identifier of a resourceidentified in the request, and an expiration period of the request, andreceiving the delegation token from the authorization service, whereinthe authorization service is configured to generate the delegation tokenupon authorizing access to the resource identified in the request withinthe expiration period.

In an example, signing the nonce token includes signing the nonce tokenusing a system private key of a public/private key pair held by thesession manager service and providing a system public key of thepublic/private key pair to the secure shell router at the routeraddress.

In an example, the method further includes storing the nonce token in adata store, wherein the nonce token comprises a key sequence andascertaining whether the nonce token is valid, based at least in part onsearching the data store on the key sequence and removing the noncetoken from the data store after the secure shell router establishes asecure connection between the user device and the secure shell instance.

In an example, the method further includes terminating the secure shellinstance following a period of inactivity or a termination of the secureconnection by the user device.

In an example, configuring the secure shell instance includes reservinga block volume, receiving a domain identifier corresponding to the blockvolume, allocating an instance on the block volume using the domainidentifier, the instance being allocated from a plurality of availableinstances, receiving the shell identifier corresponding to the instance,and installing a configuration file on the instance, the configurationfile comprising request information included in the request.

In an example, the secure shell instance runs a docker container, suchthat the request comprises an instruction to execute a terminal on thedocker container.

In a second aspect, a computer system includes one or more processorsand a memory in communication with the one or more processors, thememory configured to store computer-executable instructions, whereinexecuting the computer-executable instructions causes the one or moreprocessors to perform steps including one or more steps of the method ofthe first aspect and subsequent examples.

In a third aspect, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,storing computer-executable instructions that, when executed, cause oneor more processors of a computer system to perform steps including oneor more steps of the method of the first aspect and subsequent examples.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates an example system for managing secure shellinstances, in accordance with one or more embodiments.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example system for managing a secure shellsession, in accordance with one or more embodiments.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example system for connecting a user device to asecure shell instance, in accordance with one or more embodiments.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example system for configuring a secure shellinstance with a single use nonce token, in accordance with one or moreembodiments.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example technique for authorizing a user deviceconnecting to a secure shell instance, in accordance with one or moreembodiments.

FIG. 6 illustrates a sequence diagram showing an example data flow bywhich a user device is connected to a secure shell instance, inaccordance with one or more embodiments.

FIG. 7 illustrates a sequence diagram showing an example data flow bywhich a user device is connected to a secure shell instance using anauthorization service, in accordance with one or more embodiments.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example flow for managing a secure shell session,in accordance with one or more embodiments.

FIG. 9 illustrates an example flow for configuring a secure shellinstance with a single use nonce token, in accordance with one or moreembodiments.

FIG. 10 is a block diagram illustrating one pattern for implementing acloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least oneembodiment.

FIG. 11 is a block diagram illustrating another pattern for implementinga cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least oneembodiment.

FIG. 12 is a block diagram illustrating another pattern for implementinga cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least oneembodiment.

FIG. 13 is a block diagram illustrating another pattern for implementinga cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least oneembodiment.

FIG. 14 is a block diagram illustrating an example computer system,according to at least one embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

In the following description, various embodiments will be described. Forpurposes of explanation, specific configurations and details are setforth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments.However, it will also be apparent to one skilled in the art that theembodiments may be practiced without the specific details. Furthermore,well-known features may be omitted or simplified in order not to obscurethe embodiment being described.

Cloud-based platforms provide scalable and flexible computing resourcesfor users. Such cloud-based platforms, also referred to asinfrastructure as a service (IaaS) may offer entire suites of cloudsolutions around a customer's data, for example solutions for authoringtransformations, loading data, and presenting the data. Users of IaaSresources may request to create a secure terminal in a secure shellinstance, so that operations and data transfers may be carried outsecurely (e.g., with two-way encryption via a WebSocket secure, or wss,connection).

In some embodiments, a shell instance can be a specialized computeinstance that may run a docker container (e.g., a host) and may allow auser device to run terminals on that docker container. A user device maybe assigned a single host, but may also create multiple active terminalson that host. A shell instance may be terminated after a period ofinactivity. The instance may run the host, which may in turn run asecure shell (e.g., a terminal). In some embodiments, instances and/orhosts also may be terminated when no terminals have been active on thehost for a period of time.

In some embodiments, an instance agent may run on an allocated instanceand may handle receiving Web Socket traffic and sending that traffic toa secure shell running on the host. The instance agent may be an HTTPserver that may be configured to open secure Web Socket connections andto redirect the input and output to a terminal (e.g., a secure shellrunning on a docker container) running on the instance. In someembodiments, the agent may identify an updated version of the dockercontainer, may start the docker container, and may create the terminalin the container. In some embodiments, the agent may further specializethe docker container to contain secure shell configuration informationand may execute the terminal in the docker container at least in part bypassing in specific environmental variables.

In some embodiments, a session manager service can provide command lineaccess to a user's resources from a browser. The session manager servicemay provide a number of available compute instances that can beallocated and/or specialized to support a specific user account.Providing the available compute instances (e.g., by creating one or morecompute instances configured with default parameters prior to receivinga secure shell request) may permit the session manager service toimprove latency of system response (e.g., by creating and specializingthe instance within 5 seconds, 10 seconds, 30 seconds, 60 second, etc.).The session manager service may also provide a web-based terminal thatmay allow a user to use IaaS infrastructure resources (e.g., throughproprietary and/or other unix commands) on a specialized instancethrough a secure connection that is validated at multiple operationsbefore the connection is finalized.

In some embodiments, the techniques described herein may be incorporatedas computer-executable instructions in a software developer kit (SDK)that may be used by the web-based terminal to create and access theseresources. In this way, the SDK could also be used by other providers toimplement a secure web-based terminal. Additionally, the techniquesdescribed herein may permit a user device to connect to a secure shellrunning one or more terminals with improved security and latency. Forexample, by selecting and configuring a secure shell instance from aplurality of available instances, rather than creating a new instance atthe time of a request to connect securely to a secure shell, the sessionmanager may potentially improve system latency introduced by thepre-configuration of instances.

Furthermore, implementing one or more techniques for securing the one ormore terminals may improve the operation and performance of the systemsdescribed herein. For example, providing a nonce token that may besigned by both the session manager service and the user device, with anoperation of checking the signatures (e.g., implemented by a routerfacilitating the connection of the user device to the secure shellinstance), may provide improved security and may prevent unauthorizedaccess to the data and or IaaS resources via a terminal running on thesecure shell instance. Furthermore, implementing a single-use protocolwhereby a validity of the nonce token may be determined in connection toa database of unused nonce tokens may prevent reuse of nonce tokens.Additionally, multi-step security protocols may also provide additionaluser authentication and resource authorization protections that maypermit the session manager service to prevent reuse of login tokens(e.g., tokens generated by an identity authorization service afterauthenticating a user device) by unauthorized and/or inauthentic userdevices. Additionally, configuring the secure shell in a dockercontainer system may improve security by isolating data related to thesecure shell and thereby potentially reducing exposure of external datato breach.

FIG. 1 illustrates an example system 100 for managing secure shellinstances, in accordance with one or more embodiments. In someembodiments, the system 100 may permit a user to connect securely to acompute instance (e.g., a virtual machine, or “VM” or a dockercontainer). Secure access may permit a user to connect to a distributedcomputing system resource (e.g., Infrastructure as a Service, or “IaaS”)including, but not limited to, distributed storage, compute cores, etc.,over an encrypted connection (e.g., https, and/or WebSocket Secure“WSS”) for real-time data transfer with a VM of the IaaS system. In someembodiments, a user device 110 may generate a signed request for asecure shell instance, and may send the signed request to a sessionmanager service 120. The session manager service 120 may performoperations as part of validating the user device 110 and configuring asecure shell instance as part of fulfilling the signed request.

In some embodiments, the user device 110 may generate the signed requestusing a user interface including, but not limited to a graphical userinterface console, or a command line interface (CLI). The user interfaceinclude an identity authorization service, which may generate a userpublic/private key pair. In some cases, the user public/private key pairmay be a temporary key pair generated, for example, at theinitialization of a session, at the time of generating a request for asecure VM connection, etc. The user device 110 may generate the signedrequest using the private key of the user public/private key pair, asdescribed in more detail in reference to FIG. 2 .

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may implement oneor more authorization steps as part of managing and preparing a secureshell instance, as described in more detail in reference to FIG. 5 andFIG. 7 , below. The authorization may include receiving and validatingthe signed request, for example, by requesting the public key (e.g.,from an authorization service) and using the key to validate thesignature of the signed request (e.g., as a step of validating theidentity of the user device 110). Additionally or alternatively, thepublic key may be included in a login token provided by theauthorization service, as described in more detail in reference to FIG.2 , below.

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may fulfill thesigned request at least in part by reserving and configuring a secureshell instance. In some cases, the session manager service 120 maycommunicate with a volume manager service 130 to reserve a block volume140. The volume manager service 130 may return a domain identifier ofthe block volume 140 to the session manager service 120. In someembodiments, the domain identifier may describe one or more data centerswithin a geographic region (e.g., an availability domain, or “AD”) ofthe block volume 140 that has been reserved.

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may provide thedomain identifier of the block volume 140 (e.g., the AD of the reservedblock volume) to an instance manager service 150. The instance managerservice 150 may allocate a compute instance in the AD provided by thevolume manager service. The instance manager service 150 may provideinstance identifier information (e.g., a cloud infrastructure ID) forthe allocated instance to the session manager service 120. Allocation ofa compute instance may be done on a per-user basis and/or on aper-compartment basis (where a compartment is a logical container thatcontrols access to cloud system resources, and may includesub-compartments). For example, the session manager service 120 mayallocate separate instances for a user in different compartments. Incontrast, the session manager service 120 may allocate a single computeinstance for multiple containers, such that separate containers sharethe same compute instance, one container per compartment (where acontainer is a packaged software application that may includeapplication code, runtime, system tools, system libraries, and settings.

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may provide theinstance identifier to the user device 110, along with a router addressof a router 160. The router 160 may be configured to connect the userdevice to a secure shell instance, as described in more detail below(e.g., via a duplexing web socket connection). Furthermore, the routermay also be configured to validate the user device 110 and the sessionmanager service 120 as part of securely connecting the user device 110to the secure shell instance, as described below.

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may generate anonce token as a part of the authorization and validation of the userdevice 110 secure connection to a secure shell instance. In someembodiments, the nonce token may be a web token (e.g., a JavaScriptObject Notation “json” web token, or “jwt” token) containing informationincluding, but not limited to a header, a validity period (e.g., inminutes before expiration), a key, and/or a random or pseudo-randomstring (e.g., an alphanumeric sequence of set length, a random orpseudo-random number, or the like). In some cases, the nonce token isgenerated and provided to the user device 110 along with the instanceidentifier and the router address.

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may store the noncetoken in a nonce and identifier store 170. The nonce and identifierstore 170 may be a distributed data store (e.g., cloud storage) storinga nonce table, as described in more detail in reference to FIG. 4 ,below, which may permit the session manager service 120 to furthersecure the access of the user device to a secure shell instance, forexample, by tracking nonce tokens and ensuring that nonce tokens arevalid for a single request from the user device 110. Similarly, thenonce and identifier store 170 may also store a login token, provided byan authorization service, that contains a user public key of the userkey pair, which may be used to verify the user device 110 duringfulfillment of the user request, as described in more detail inreference to FIG. 2 , FIG. 5 , and FIG. 7 , below.

As part of configuring the secure shell instance, the session managerservice 120 may select and configure an existing instance from a pool ofavailable instances 180, as described in more detail in reference to thefigures below. In some cases, the session manager service may install aconfiguration file and a delegation token in the selected instance. Theconfiguration may include parameter information including, but notlimited to, the instance identifier, the domain identifier, requestdetails (e.g., resource allocations, compartment, tenancy), etc. Thedelegation token may permit the user device 110 to access IaaS systemresources without additional authorization at the level of the instance.

In some embodiments, the configuration parameters installed by thesession manager service 120 may be stored in an instance configurationstore 190. The instance configuration store 190 may permit a new secureshell instance to be restored and/or reconfigured with requestparameters following termination of the secure shell instance. In someembodiments, the secure shell instance will be terminated when the userhas completed using it. In some embodiments, the session manager service120 may instruct the instance manager service 150 to terminate thesecure shell instance based on a period of inactivity (e.g., an idletime) of the agent and/or activity via the router 160. The idle time maybe provided as part of the configuration parameters. In someembodiments, a user of the user device 110 may request the secure shellinstance to be terminated, which may be implemented by the sessionmanager service 120.

As described above, the example system 100 may provide improved securityand stability of IaaS systems, at least by permitting a user device toconnect to a secure shell instance from a console and/or command lineinterface. For example, using single use nonce tokens and instances maypotentially contain the risk of breakout (where software accesses dataand/or resources outside authorized limits). Single use nonce tokens,for example, may be signed by a private key of the user device, whichmay prevent another user from accessing the secure shell instance. Asanother example, single use instances may reduce the potential effectsof breakout from a container by replacing an instance after it is nolonger in use, rather than reusing instances which could potentiallycompromise subsequent user devices using the same instance.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example system 200 for managing a secure shellsession, in accordance with one or more embodiments. In reference to thesystem described in FIG. 1 (e.g., example system 100), the examplesystem 200 may include one or more of the constituent elements (e.g.,volume manager service 130, instance manager service 150, instances 180,etc. of FIG. 1 ). In some embodiments, the example system 200 mayimplement one or more authorization and security protocols as part ofproviding a secure connection between a user device and a secure shellinstance.

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may receive asigned request from the user device 110 (e.g., operation 202), where thesigned request can be generated by the user device 110. In someembodiments, the user may request a secure shell via a command lineinterface (CLI) and/or a graphical user interface (GUI), also referredto as a “console” interface. In some cases, the system 200 includes aGUI/CLI login service 220 that may facilitate the communication ofidentity and authorization information with the session manager service120. For example, a secure shell request may be signed by a private keygenerated by the GUI/CLI login service 220 as part of a public/privatekey pair associated with a user session. For example, a user loginand/or identity validation may include generating a temporarypublic/private key pair that can be used to sign the secure shellrequest with the private key. The public key may be provided to anauthorization service 230 as part of authorizing access of the userdevice 110 and generating a login token (e.g., an access token), whichcan be provided to the session manager service 120 to authorize thesigned request (e.g., operation 204).

In some embodiments, the authorization service 230 may perform identityauthorization for the user device based on username/password accountdetails, as well as authorizing access to a specific IaaS resourceand/or a hierarchical resource layer (e.g., a root compartmentcontaining sub-compartments associated with IaaS resources). Theauthorization service 230 may communicate directly with the GUI/CLIlogin service 220 during an initial step of login/authorization, fromwhich the GUI/CLI login service 220 may provide the login token to thesession manager service 120. As described in more detail in reference toFIG. 5 and FIG. 7 , below, the session manager service 120 may implementadditional operations as part of authorizing access to the secure shell(e.g., operation 204).

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may reserve a shellinstance for use in creating a secure shell instance 240 (e.g.,operation 206). As described in more detail in reference to FIGS. 3-4 ,below, reserving a shell instance may include one or more operationsincluding, but not limited to, reserving a volume, allocating aninstance in the reserved volume, and configuring the allocated instance.The session manager service 120 may receive a shell instance identifieras part of reserving the shell instance, and may provide informationincluding, but not limited to the shell instance identifier, a useridentifier associated with the user device 110, and an expiration time(e.g., a validity duration) as part of requesting a delegation tokenfrom the authorization service 230 (e.g., operation 208).

The authorization service 230 may generate the delegation token andprovide it to the session manager service 120, as an approach to permitthe user device 110 to connect securely to the secure shell instance 240(e.g., operation 210). In some embodiments, the session manager service120 may configure the reserved shell instance by installing thedelegation token received from the authorization service (e.g.,operation 212). As described in more detail in reference to FIG. 4 ,configuring the secure shell instance 240 may include implementing aconfiguration of the instance (e.g., installing a configuration fileincluding one or more aspects of the signed request).

Following receipt of the delegation token from the authorization service230, the session manager service 120 may provide a secure shell token tothe GUI/CLI login service 220 (e.g., operation 214). As described inmore detail in reference to the following paragraphs, additionalvalidation and access control operations may be implemented by thesession manager service 120 including, but not limited to generating,signing, and/or storing a nonce token. In some embodiments, the secureshell token may include additional access control elements and may beassociated with metadata including the delegation token.

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may also providethe shell instance identifier to a secure shell router 250 (e.g.,operation 216). In some embodiments, the secure shell router may be anexample of the router 160 of FIG. 1 . The secure shell router 250 maystore the shell instance identifier, and may use the secure shellidentifier as part of validating the user device 110 during connectionto the secure shell instance 240, as described in more detail inreference to FIG. 3 , below.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example system 300 for connecting a user device toa secure shell instance, in accordance with one or more embodiments.Similarly to the techniques described in reference to FIG. 2 , thesession manager service 120 may facilitate the connection of the userdevice 110 to the secure shell router 250, as part of connecting to thesecure shell instance 240.

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may receive thesigned request from the user device 110 to create a secure shellinstance, as described in more detail in reference to FIG. 2 (e.g., viathe GUI/CLI login service 220 of FIG. 2 ). The request may include arequest for the session manager service 120 to create a host for thesecure shell instance (e.g., operation 302). The host may refer to acloud resource container and/or a volume as implemented in IaaSresources. The request may include the security, authorizationinformation described in reference to FIG. 2 , and as such theoperations and elements of the system 300 may include one or moreelements and/or operations described above (e.g., authorization service230 of FIG. 2 generating a delegation token).

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may configure thehost for the secure shell instance (e.g., operation 304). One or moreconstituent operations included in the configuration of the host aredescribed in more detail in reference to FIG. 4 , below. In someembodiments, the session manager service 120 may reserve and allocate aninstance using one or more manager services 330 including, but notlimited to, the volume manager service 130 and the instance managerservice 150, as described in more detail in reference to FIG. 1 , above.

As part of creating secure access for the user device 110 to the secureshell instance 240, the session manager service 120 may generate andprovide a nonce token, a shell identifier, and a router address to theuser device 110 (e.g., operation 306). As described in more detail inreference to FIG. 1 , the nonce token may include a web token (e.g., aJWT token) that may include a random string having a predefined numberof characters and/or numerals (e.g., an eight character string ofletters and numbers). The shell identifier may be included in the secureshell token described in reference to FIG. 2 . The router address mayidentify the secure shell router 250, and may permit the user device torequest to connect to the secure shell router 250 via a secureconnection (e.g., a WebSocket secure, or “WSS,” connection).

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may sign the noncetoken, for example, using a private key of a key pair identified withthe session manager service 120. An additional validation procedure, asdescribed in more detail in reference to FIG. 5 , may include validationof the system-signed nonce generated by the session manager service 120signing the nonce token. To that end, the session manager service 120may provide the system-signed nonce along with the shell instanceidentifier to the user device 110 and/or the secure shell router. Insome embodiments, when the session manager service 120 provides thesystem-signed nonce to the user device 110, the user device 110 may signthe system-signed nonce and provide the doubly-signed nonce to thesecure shell router 250.

The secure shell router 250 may receive a connection request from theuser device 110, which may include a user-signed nonce token (e.g.,operation 308). The user-signed nonce token, analogously to thesystem-signed nonce, may be generated by signing the nonce token with aprivate key held by the user device 110. As described above, the userprivate key may form a part of a key pair generated by the GIU/CLI loginservice (e.g., a temporary public/private key pair), for which thepublic key may be provided to the session manager service 120 and/or thesecure shell router 250.

As part of granting the connection request, the secure shell router 250may validate the user and system signatures (e.g., operation 310). Thesecure shell router 250 may validate the nonce token at least in part bychecking whether the nonce token is not expired (e.g., if the noncetoken includes a validity duration). Validation may be implemented by arequest from the session manager service 120 (e.g., the session managerservice 120 may ascertain whether the nonce is valid and may provide anindication of validity). The secure shell router 250 may also validatethat the nonce token has not been previously used for a connectionrequest, as described in more detail in reference to FIG. 4 , below.

In some embodiments, the secure shell router 250 may validate one ormore of the signatures at least in part by decrypting the user andsystem signed nonce tokens using the public keys for the user device 110and the session manager service 120, respectively. In some embodiments,as when the user device 110 signs the system signed nonce token, thesecure shell router 250 may validate the user signature by decryptingthe doubly-signed nonce token using the user-public key, and the systemsignature using the system public key. Decrypting in this way may permitthe secure shell router 250 to confirm the nonce value and validate thenonce token. In some embodiments, validation may be achieved, forexample, by comparing the decrypted nonce tokens to ascertain whetherthe nonce tokens match.

Following validation of the nonce token and the user and systemsignatures, the secure shell router 250 may connect the user device 110to the secure shell instance 240 (e.g., operation 312). As described inmore detail in reference to FIG. 1 , above, the secure shell router 250may provide a WebSocket Secure (wss) connection, which may enableinteraction between a web browser (or other client application) and aweb server hosting the secure shell instance 240 (e.g., full-duplexcommunication) via encrypted messages.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example system 400 for configuring a secure shellinstance with a single use nonce token, in accordance with one or moreembodiments. As part of reserving and configuring the shell instance, asdescribed in more detail in reference to FIGS. 2-3 , above, the sessionmanager service 120 may perform one or more operations in coordinationwith constituent services of the example system 400.

In some embodiments, the session manager service may receive a requestfrom the user device to connect to a secure shell (e.g., operation 402),as described above in reference to authorizing and validating the userrequest. In response to receiving the user request, the session managerservice 120 may reserve a volume in coordination with the volume managerservice 130 (e.g., operation 404). Reserving the volume may involvesteps including, but not limited to, ascertaining, by the volume managerservice 130, whether one or more block volumes are already associatedand/or assigned to the user (e.g., user block volumes 430) of the userdevice 110 and are available to host the secure shell instance 240(e.g., operation 406). This may include checking a user identifier(e.g., a username or login ID) against a registry of block volumesmanaged by the volume manager service 130. Where a user block volume 430is identified, domain identifier information (e.g., a resource ID, adata-center infrastructure locator, etc.) may be returned to the sessionmanager service 120 to indicate the volume has been reserved to host thesecure shell instance 240 (e.g., operation 408).

The volume manager service 130 may find that a user block volume 430 isnot available to host the secure shell instance 240. In someembodiments, the volume manager service may reserve an empty blockvolume 440, which may include one or more of the block volumes 140 thatare available at the given data center for which a user may not alreadybe assigned. Similarly, the volume manager service 130 may provideresource identifier information for the session manager service 120 toimplement in subsequent operations. For example, the session managerservice 120 may allocate an instance in the block volume 140 returned bythe volume manager service 130 (e.g., operation 410).

In some embodiments, allocating the instance may include providing thedomain identifier to the instance manager service 150. As described inmore detail in reference to FIG. 1 , the instance manager service 150may select and reserve an existing instance that is maintained as partof a number of available instances that may be reconfigured for use assecure shell instances. The instance manager service 150 may return aninstance identifier (e.g., instance ID) to the session manager service120, which may permit the session manager service 120 to identify theselected instance in subsequent operations. In some embodiments,selecting and reserving an existing instance, rather than creating andconfiguring an instance at the time of implementing the connectionrequest, may potentially reduce system latency in processing theconnection request.

The session manager service 120 may configure the selected instance atleast in part by installing a configuration file (e.g., operation 412).The configuration file may identify IaaS resource details (e.g.,compartment, root compartment, domain identifier, etc.) and/or usagedetails to facilitate completion of the user connection request. Thedelegation token, as described in more detail in reference to FIG. 2 ,above, may be generated by an authorization service (e.g., authorizationservice 220 of FIG. 2 ). Installing the delegation token on the secureshell instance 240 may permit the user device 110 to access IaaS systemresources directly via the secure shell instance 240, without additionalrequests to the authorization service for each resource and/or request.

The example system 400 may include the additional validation operationsdescribed in more detail in reference to FIG. 3 . For example, thesession manager service 120 may generate, sign, and store a nonce token(e.g., a temporary JWT token) in nonce and identifier store 170, as partof implementing a single-use nonce approach as part of the noncevalidation protocol (e.g., operation 414). For example, the nonce andidentifier store 170 may contain a nonce table that includes a list ofnonce tokens (e.g., nonce “key” sequences that may be used to trackwhether a nonce is issued and valid) and may include the associatedinstance identifier information for each nonce, as an approach forattributing a nonce token to a secure shell instance 240 whenimplementing one or more validation operations, as described in moredetail in reference to FIG. 5 , below. Since, in some cases, a noncetoken may be temporary, the nonce table may include timing informationincluding, but not limited to, issue time, validity period, etc. In thisway, a nonce token may be found and its validity ascertained as part offulfilling a connection request. In some embodiments, after the userdevice 110 is connected to the secure shell instance 240 (e.g.,operation 314 of FIG. 3 ), the corresponding nonce token may be removedfrom the nonce table in the nonce and identifier store 170. In suchcases, the session manager service 120 may permit nonce tokens to besingle use, which may reduce the risk of unauthorized access to thesecure shell instance 240 (e.g., by “spoofing” using a valid noncetoken).

FIG. 5 illustrates an example technique 500 for authorizing a userdevice connecting to a secure shell instance, in accordance with one ormore embodiments. In connection with the systems described above, one ormore access control operations may be implemented as part of creating asecure connection between the user device 110 and the secure shellinstance 240. The operations described in reference to managing a secureshell session may include one or more of the operations described inreference to the preceding figures, for example, using user ID logincontrols, delegation tokens, and/or signed nonce tokens with signaturevalidation.

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 receives a signedrequest to create the secure shell instance 240, the request beingcreated and signed by the user device 110. As described in more detailin reference to FIG. 2 , the request may be received from the GUI/CLIlogin service 220, which may generate the key pair used by the userdevice 110 to sign the request.

The session manager service 120 may authenticate the user request usinguser login or IaaS ID authentication, as described in more detail inreference to FIG. 2 (e.g., operation 510). For example, the identity ofthe user may be authenticated by an authorization service (e.g.,authorization service 230), at least in part by authorizing ausername/password in combination with a data center identifier or otherIaaS resource access parameter. The authorization service may generate alogin token that includes the user public key of the key pair generatedby the GUI/CLI login service 220. The authorization service may providethe login token to the user device and/or the GUI/CLI login service 220after signing the login token with a private key of the authorizationservice. In this way, the session manager service 120 may authenticateboth the signed request from the user device 110 and the user identityby requesting the authorization service public key from theauthorization service. In some embodiments, the session manager service120 may also extract the user public key from the login token, and mayuse the user public key to verify the signature on the signed request.

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may authorize thesecure shell instance 240 (e.g., operation 520). As described in moredetail in reference to FIG. 2 , authorizing the secure shell instance240 may include requesting a delegation token from the authorizationservice. In some cases, delegation token may be issued in response toauthorizing access to IaaS system resources based at least in part on acombination of a user ID, an instance identifier, and whether therequest has expired (e.g., a temporary key pair is still valid and/or ifthe request itself has expired). Receiving the delegation token maypermit the session manager service 120 to configure the secure shellinstance 240 to access IaaS system resources (e.g., compute resources,core services, storage resources, etc.) without further authenticationand/or authorization, once a secure connection between the secure shellinstance 240 and the user device 110 has been established.

In some embodiments, the session manager service 120 may generate anonce token and provide the nonce token, as well as other information,to the user device 110 and or the GUI/CLI login service 220. In someembodiments, the session manager service 120 provides a system-signednonce token to the secure shell router 250. In some embodiments, thesession manager service provides the system-signed nonce token to theuser device 110, as part of signature validation (e.g., operation 530).The user device 110 may sign the system-signed nonce, generating adoubly-signed nonce. In so doing, the session manager service 120 mayalso provide the public key matched to the private key used to sign thesystem-signed nonce token. The secure shell router 250 may receive theuser-signed nonce token from the user device 110, and may validate thesignatures to authenticate the request. In some embodiments, validatingthe signatures may include decrypting the doubly-signed nonce using theuser public key and the system public key to verify the user signatureand the system signature, respectively. Validation may include comparingthe decrypted nonce to the system-generated nonce, for example, asstored in a database of nonce tokens (e.g., nonce and identifier store170 of FIG. 1 ). In some embodiments, validating the signatures mayinclude decrypting the user-signed nonce token and the system-signednonce token and comparing the nonce string included in the nonce tokensto confirm a match.

In an example, the secure shell router 240, on connecting with thesession manager service 120 and receiving the nonce token, may extractthe expiration from the nonce token. The lifetime of the nonce may beconfigurable (e.g., an expiration time may be five minutes or any othernumber of seconds, minutes, or hours). If the nonce token has expired,the secure shell router 250 may return an error rather than establishingthe secure connection. If the nonce token hasn't expired, the secureshell router 250 may verify the nonce token (e.g., by signaturevalidation), and if invalid the secure shell router 250 may return thesame error. In some embodiments, the secure shell router 250 mayinvalidate a valid nonce token to prevent reuse of the same nonce token.After the three access control operations are concluded successfully,the secure shell router 250 may connect the user device 110 to thesecure shell instance 240 (e.g., via a wss connection).

FIG. 6 illustrates a sequence diagram showing an example data flow 600by which a user device is connected to a secure shell instance, inaccordance with one or more embodiments. A user of the user device 110requests to connect to a secure shell instance through a GUI and/or aCLI, and the session manager service 120 coordinates the IaaS resources,configures the instance, and provides for a nonce to be used forvalidating the user device 110 to the secure shell router 250.

In data flow 600, the user device 110 (which may be an example of userdevice 110 of FIG. 1 ) may submit a request to connect to a secure shellinstance. as described in more detail in reference to FIG. 2 , therequest may be submitted through a GUI/CLI login service (e.g. GUI/CLIlogin service 210 of FIG. 2 ) and may be received by the session managerservice 120. The request may be signed by a private key of apublic/private key pair generated by the GUI/CLI login service. The keypair may be temporary, and the validity of the key pair may serve as oneof the validation parameters of the signed request, as described in moredetail in reference to FIG. 5 , above, and FIG. 7 , below.

Upon receiving the signed request, the session manager service 120 mayconfigure a shell instance, as described in more detail in reference tothe figures above. Configuring a shell instance may include multipleoperations including, but not limited to reserving a volume, allocatingan instance from a number of available instances that are created forthe purpose of configuring a secure shell instance, and installing aconfiguration file on the allocated instance that may include adelegation token. As described in more detail in reference to FIG. 7 ,below, one or more operations may be included to authenticate the useridentity and to authorize access to IaaS system resources via the secureshell instance.

Configuring the shell instance may include receiving, by the sessionmanager service 120, a shell instance identifier from an instancemanager service (e.g., an IaaS resource identifier). With the shellinstance identifier, the session manager service 120 may generate anonce token, and may receive a router address corresponding to thesecure shell router 250 (which may be an example of the secure shellrouter 250 of FIG. 2 ). The session manager service 120 may sign thenonce token using a private key of a public/private key pair held by thesession manager service 120. The session manager service 120 may providethe system-signed nonce, the shell instance identifier, and the routeraddress to the user device 110 (e.g., via the GUI/CLI login service),which may permit the user device to address the secure shell router 250as part of connecting to the secure shell instance. In some embodiments,the session manager service 120 may provide an unsigned nonce token tothe user device 110. In such cases, the session manager service 120 maysign the nonce token to generate a system-signed nonce token.

Upon receiving the information from the session manager service 120(e.g., the nonce token, the shell instance identifier, and the routeraddress), the user device 110 may sign the nonce token (e.g., using theprivate key of the key pair used to sign the request). The user device110 may then connect to the secure shell router 250 (e.g., at the routeraddress), and may provide the user-signed nonce token and the shellinstance identifier. In some embodiments, the user-signed nonce tokenincludes both a user signature and a system signature, therebypermitting signature validation of both the user device 110 and thesession manager service 120 using a single, doubly-signed, nonce token.

To validate the request received from the user device 110, the secureshell router 250 may request the shell identifier associated with therequest and a system-signed nonce from the session manager service 120.In response, the session manager service 120 may provide the shellinstance identifier and the system-signed nonce to the secure shellrouter 250. In some embodiments, as when the session manager service 120provides a system-signed nonce to the user device 110, the secure shellrouter 250 may not request a system signed nonce from the sessionmanager service 120.

As described in more detail in reference to FIG. 5 , the secure shellrouter may check the signatures by decrypting the signed nonce tokenusing the user public key and the system public key. Validation may alsoinclude comparing the shell instance identifier received from both theuser device 110 and the session manager service 120.

Upon validating the signatures, the secure shell router 250 may connectthe user device 110 to the secure shell instance (e.g., secure shellinstance 240 of FIG. 2 ) by an encrypted connection (e.g., a wssconnection). In some embodiments, as when the session manager service120 stores the nonce token and the corresponding shell instanceidentifier in a data store, the session manager service 120 or thesecure shell router 250 may remove the entry for the nonce token fromthe data store, for example, after validating the signed nonce token andconnecting the user device 110 to the secure shell instance.

FIG. 7 illustrates a sequence diagram showing an example data flow 700by which a user device is connected to a secure shell instance using anauthorization service 230, in accordance with one or more embodiments.The authorization service 230 may include, but is not limited to, ageneral user identity authorization service that may be used toauthorize access to IaaS resources, for example, by authorizing logincredentials. Involvement of the authorization service 230 may includeone or more preliminary identity verification and access authorizationoperations, as described in more detail in reference to FIG. 5 , above.

In data flow 700, session manager service 120 receives the signedrequest from the user device 110, as described in reference to thepreceding figures. Upon receiving the signed request, the sessionmanager service 120 may request an authorization service public key fromthe authorization service. The authorization service public key may beused to decrypt a login token received with the signed request (e.g.,the login token may have been signed by the authorization serviceprivate key paired to the corresponding public key), to identify useridentifier information (e.g., username/password combinations, requestidentifier information, etc.). The authorization service 230 may providethe public key to the session manager service 120, which may thenrequest authentication of the user identity using identifier informationfrom the login token. The authorization service 230 may confirm the useridentity.

Upon receiving authentication of the identity of the user device 110,the session manager service 120 may request a delegation token from theauthorization service 230. The delegation token, as described in moredetail in reference to FIG. 2 , may be used by the session managerservice to indicate that the user device is authorized to connect toIaaS system resources via the secure shell instance that has beenconfigured to fulfill the signed request. Authorization of the user toconnect to IaaS system resources via the secure shell may includeproviding IaaS resource information included in the signed request, suchthat the authorization service 230 may determine whether the user device110 is authorized to connect to the particular resources beingrequested.

Upon authorizing the user device 110, the authorization service 230 maygenerate and provide the delegation token to the session manager service120. The session manager service 120 may install the delegation token onthe secure shell instance (e.g., secure shell instance 240 of FIG. 2 ).Configuring the secure shell instance may include additional and/oralternative operations, as described above.

As described in reference to FIG. 6 , the session manager service 120may generate a nonce token, sign the nonce token using a system privatekey of a public/private key pair of the session manager service 120 togenerate a signed nonce token, and provide the signed nonce token alongwith the shell instance identifier and the router address correspondingto the secure shell router 250 (e.g., a “router endpoint”) to the userdevice 110. The user device 110 may sign the system-signed nonce tokenand send a request (e.g., a request to establish a WebSocket Secure, or“wss” connection) including the user-signed nonce token to the secureshell router as part of a validation process. The user-signed nonce,also signed by the session manager service, may be used by the secureshell router 250 to validate the request. In some embodiments, asdescribed in more detail in reference to FIG. 6 , the session managerservice 120 may send an unsigned nonce to the user device 110, such thatboth a user-signed nonce and a system-signed nonce are provided to thesecure shell router 250 for validation.

The secure shell router 250 may validate the signatures, as described inmore detail in reference to FIG. 6 , above. Upon validating the systemand user signatures and authenticating the nonce token and the shellinstance identifier, the secure shell router may connect the user deviceto the secure shell instance.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example flow 800 for managing a secure shellsession, in accordance with one or more embodiments. The operations ofthe flow can be implemented as hardware circuitry and/or stored ascomputer-readable instructions on a non-transitory computer-readablemedium of a computer system, such as the session manager service 120 ofFIG. 1 . As implemented, the instructions represent modules that includecircuitry or code executable by a processor(s) of the computer system.The execution of such instructions configures the computer system toperform the specific operations described herein. Each circuitry or codein combination with the processor performs the respective operation(s).While the operations are illustrated in a particular order, it should beunderstood that no particular order is necessary and that one or moreoperations may be omitted, skipped, and/or reordered.

In an example, the flow 800 includes an operation 802, where thecomputer system receives a request to connect a user device (e.g., userdevice 110 of FIG. 1 ) to a secure shell instance (e.g., secure shellinstance 240 of FIG. 2 ). As described in more detail in reference toFIG. 2 and FIG. 6 , the request may be a signed request generated by theuser device and/or by a login service (e.g., GUI/CLI login service 210of FIG. 2 ), and provided to the session manager service forimplementation. The request may be signed by a private key generated bythe GUI/CLI login service, and may be used to authenticate the identityof the user device, as described in more detail in reference to FIG. 2and FIG. 7 .

In an example, the flow 800 includes an operation 804, where thecomputer system authorizes the user device to access the secure shellinstance. As described in more detail in reference to FIG. 9 ,authorizing the user device may include one or more operations involvingan external authorization service (e.g., authorization service 230 ofFIG. 2 ). The authorization service may provide authentication of theuser (e.g., by validating user identifier such as username/password),and may authorize access to the IaaS resource described in the request.

In an example, the flow 800 includes an operation 806, where thecomputer system configures the secure shell instance, being described bya shell identifier of the secure shell instance. In some embodiments,configuring the secure shell instance may include, but is not limitedto, reserving a block volume, allocating an instance in the blockvolume, and installing a configuration file and a delegation token onthe instance. Optionally, reserving the block volume may includechecking whether the user device is already associated with a blockvolume (e.g., user block volumes 430 of FIG. 4 ) or is not yetassociated with a block volume, in which case an empty block volume(e.g., empty block volumes 440 of FIG. 4 ) may be reserved. Optionally,allocating an instance may include selecting an instance from aplurality of available instances. Maintaining the plurality of availableinstances, for example with one or more default configurations that maybe reconfigured by installing the configuration file, may permit thesession manager service to respond more rapidly (i.e., with lowerlatency) to the request. In some embodiments, reserving a block volumeand allocating an instance may include communicating with a volumemanager service (e.g., volume manager service 130 of FIG. 1 ) and aninstance manager service (e.g., instance manager service 150 of FIG. 1).

In an example, the flow 800 includes an operation 808, where thecomputer system generates a nonce token. The nonce token may be a webtoken (e.g., a JSON Web Token, or JWT token) that includes one or moretypes of information. Optionally, the nonce token includes a keysequence that may be used to track whether the nonce is valid for use.For example, the session manager service may store the nonce token in adata store (e.g., nonce and identifier store 170 of FIG. 1 ). In someembodiments, the nonce token includes a random sequence of lettersand/or numbers (e.g., 8 alphanumeric characters), that may be used tovalidate the request.

In an example, the flow 800 includes an operation 810, where thecomputer system signs the nonce token to generate a signed nonce token.As described in more detail in reference to FIG. 3 , the system may signthe nonce token using a private key of a public/private key pair (e.g.,asymmetric encryption). In this way, the signed nonce token may beencrypted at the time of transmission to the user device (e.g., userdevice 110 of FIG. 1 ).

In an example, the flow 800 includes an operation 812, where thecomputer system provides the signed nonce token, the shell identifier,and a router address to the user device. as described in more detail inreference to FIG. 6 , the user device may send a secure connectionrequest (e.g., a WSS connection request) to a secure shell router (e.g.,secure shell router 250 of FIG. 2 ). The user device may sign the noncetoken with a private key (e.g., the same key used to sign the request),and may provide the public key paired to the private key to the secureshell router at the router address. The user device may also provide theshell identifier to the secure shell router, as part of the connectionrequest. Optionally, the computer system may provide the shellidentifier to the secure shell router at the router address, as anadditional validation parameter implemented by the secure shell router.

FIG. 9 illustrates an example flow 900 for configuring a secure shellinstance with a single use nonce token, in accordance with one or moreembodiments. The operations of the flow can be implemented as hardwarecircuitry and/or stored as computer-readable instructions on anon-transitory computer-readable medium of a computer system, such asthe session manager service system 120 of FIG. 1 . As implemented, theinstructions represent modules that include circuitry or code executableby a processor(s) of the computer system. The execution of suchinstructions configures the computer system to perform the specificoperations described herein. Each circuitry or code in combination withthe processor performs the respective operation(s). While the operationsare illustrated in a particular order, it should be understood that noparticular order is necessary and that one or more operations may beomitted, skipped, and/or reordered.

In an example, the flow 900 begins following operation 802 of FIG. 8 ,where the computer system receive from a user device a request to createa secure shell instance. In particular, the computer system (e.g., thesession manager service 120 of FIG. 1 ), may implement one or moreoperations to authenticate and/or authorize the user device from whichthe request was received, in communication with an authorization service(e.g., authorization service 230 of FIG. 2 ), as part of enabling thesession manager service to proceed with the operations described in FIG.8 .

In an example, the flow 900 includes an operation 904, where thecomputer system receives a login token including a user identifier. Asdescribed in more detail in reference to FIG. 7 , the session managerservice may request the authorization service to authenticate theidentity of the user device (e.g., as represented in the signedrequest), and to authorize access for the user device to the IaaSresource identified in the request. As part of authenticating the useridentity, the session manager service may receive the login token fromthe user device. The login token may include user information (e.g.,username/password, login credentials, expiration information of a loginsession, etc.) as well as the user public key paired to the user privatekey used to sign the request and/or the nonce token by the user device.The login token may be signed by a private key held by the authorizationservice.

In an example, the flow 900 includes an operation 906, where thecomputer system requests a public key from the authorization service.The public key, being used to sign the login token, may provide Thesession manager service may request a public key from the authorizationservice to decrypt the login token, as part of authenticating the userdevice. For example, the login token may provide user identifierinformation used to authenticate the user device (e.g., a deviceidentifier or session identifier information).

In an example, the flow 900 includes an operation 908, where thecomputer system authenticates the user device. In some embodiments, thesession manager service may extract user identifier information from thelogin token, and may compare the user identifier information to theinformation provided with the request.

In an example, the flow 900 includes an operation 910, where thecomputer system requests a delegation token. The delegation token, asdescribed in more detail in reference to FIG. 2 , may be generated bythe authorization service and provided to the session manager serviceafter the user device has been authorized to access the IaaS resourceidentified in the user request to connect to the secure shell instance.For example, the session manager service may provide user identifierinformation, instance identifier information, expiration information, orthe like, based at least in part on which the authorization service maydetermine whether the delegation token will be generated.

In an example, the flow 900 includes an operation 912, where thecomputer system receives the delegation token. The session managerservice may use the delegation token to allow the secure shell router togrant access to the user device to IaaS resources without additionalauthorization by the authorization service, for example, by installingthe delegation token on the secure shell instance, for example, as partof configuring the secure shell instance, as described in more detail inreference to FIG. 2 , above.

As noted above, infrastructure as a service (IaaS) is one particulartype of cloud computing. IaaS can be configured to provide virtualizedcomputing resources over a public network (e.g., the Internet). In anIaaS model, a cloud computing provider can host the infrastructurecomponents (e.g., servers, storage devices, network nodes (e.g.,hardware), deployment software, platform virtualization (e.g., ahypervisor layer), or the like). In some cases, an IaaS provider mayalso supply a variety of services to accompany those infrastructurecomponents (e.g., billing, monitoring, logging, security, load balancingand clustering, etc.). Thus, as these services may be policy-driven,IaaS users may be able to implement policies to drive load balancing tomaintain application availability and performance.

In some instances, IaaS customers may access resources and servicesthrough a wide area network (WAN), such as the Internet, and can use thecloud provider's services to install the remaining elements of anapplication stack. For example, the user can log in to the IaaS platformto create virtual machines (VMs), install operating systems (OSs) oneach VM, deploy middleware such as databases, create storage buckets forworkloads and backups, and even install enterprise software into thatVM. Customers can then use the provider's services to perform variousfunctions, including balancing network traffic, troubleshootingapplication issues, monitoring performance, managing disaster recovery,etc.

In most cases, a cloud computing model will require the participation ofa cloud provider. The cloud provider may, but need not be, a third-partyservice that specializes in providing (e.g., offering, renting, selling)IaaS. An entity might also opt to deploy a private cloud, becoming itsown provider of infrastructure services.

In some examples, IaaS deployment is the process of putting a newapplication, or a new version of an application, onto a preparedapplication server or the like. It may also include the process ofpreparing the server (e.g., installing libraries, daemons, etc.). Thisis often managed by the cloud provider, below the hypervisor layer(e.g., the servers, storage, network hardware, and virtualization).Thus, the customer may be responsible for handling (OS), middleware,and/or application deployment (e.g., on self-service virtual machines(e.g., that can be spun up on demand) or the like.

In some examples, IaaS provisioning may refer to acquiring computers orvirtual hosts for use, and even installing needed libraries or serviceson them. In most cases, deployment does not include provisioning, andthe provisioning may need to be performed first.

In some cases, there are two different problems for IaaS provisioning.First, there is the initial challenge of provisioning the initial set ofinfrastructure before anything is running. Second, there is thechallenge of evolving the existing infrastructure (e.g., adding newservices, changing services, removing services, etc.) once everythinghas been provisioned. In some cases, these two challenges may beaddressed by enabling the configuration of the infrastructure to bedefined declaratively. In other words, the infrastructure (e.g., whatcomponents are needed and how they interact) can be defined by one ormore configuration files. Thus, the overall topology of theinfrastructure (e.g., what resources depend on which, and how they eachwork together) can be described declaratively. In some instances, oncethe topology is defined, a workflow can be generated that creates and/ormanages the different components described in the configuration files.

In some examples, an infrastructure may have many interconnectedelements. For example, there may be one or more virtual private clouds(VPCs) (e.g., a potentially on-demand pool of configurable and/or sharedcomputing resources), also known as a core network. In some examples,there may also be one or more security group rules provisioned to definehow the security of the network will be set up and one or more virtualmachines (VMs). Other infrastructure elements may also be provisioned,such as a load balancer, a database, or the like. As more and moreinfrastructure elements are desired and/or added, the infrastructure mayincrementally evolve.

In some instances, continuous deployment techniques may be employed toenable deployment of infrastructure code across various virtualcomputing environments. Additionally, the described techniques canenable infrastructure management within these environments. In someexamples, service teams can write code that is desired to be deployed toone or more, but often many, different production environments (e.g.,across various different geographic locations, sometimes spanning theentire world). However, in some examples, the infrastructure on whichthe code will be deployed must first be set up. In some instances, theprovisioning can be done manually, a provisioning tool may be utilizedto provision the resources, and/or deployment tools may be utilized todeploy the code once the infrastructure is provisioned.

FIG. 10 is a block diagram 1000 illustrating an example pattern of anIaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. Serviceoperators 1002 can be communicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy1004 that can include a virtual cloud network (VCN) 1006 and a securehost subnet 1008. In some examples, the service operators 1002 may beusing one or more client computing devices, which may be portablehandheld devices (e.g., an iPhone®, cellular telephone, an iPad®,computing tablet, a personal digital assistant (PDA)) or wearabledevices (e.g., a Google Glass® head mounted display), running softwaresuch as Microsoft Windows Mobile®, and/or a variety of mobile operatingsystems such as iOS, Windows Phone, Android, BlackBerry 8, Palm OS, andthe like, and being Internet, e-mail, short message service (SMS),Blackberry®, or other communication protocol enabled. Alternatively, theclient computing devices can be general purpose personal computersincluding, by way of example, personal computers and/or laptop computersrunning various versions of Microsoft Windows®, Apple Macintosh®, and/orLinux operating systems. The client computing devices can be workstationcomputers running any of a variety of commercially-available UNIX® orUNIX-like operating systems, including without limitation the variety ofGNU/Linux operating systems, such as for example, Google Chrome OS.Alternatively, or in addition, client computing devices may be any otherelectronic device, such as a thin-client computer, an Internet-enabledgaming system (e.g., a Microsoft Xbox gaming console with or without aKinect® gesture input device), and/or a personal messaging device,capable of communicating over a network that can access the VCN 1006and/or the Internet.

The VCN 1006 can include a local peering gateway (LPG) 1010 that can becommunicatively coupled to a secure shell (SSH) VCN 1012 via an LPG 1010contained in the SSH VCN 1012. The SSH VCN 1012 can include an SSHsubnet 1014, and the SSH VCN 1012 can be communicatively coupled to acontrol plane VCN 1016 via the LPG 1010 contained in the control planeVCN 1016. Also, the SSH VCN 1012 can be communicatively coupled to adata plane VCN 1018 via an LPG 1010. The control plane VCN 1016 and thedata plane VCN 1018 can be contained in a service tenancy 1019 that canbe owned and/or operated by the IaaS provider.

The control plane VCN 1016 can include a control plane demilitarizedzone (DMZ) tier 1020 that acts as a perimeter network (e.g., portions ofa corporate network between the corporate intranet and externalnetworks). The DMZ-based servers may have restricted responsibilitiesand help keep security breaches contained. Additionally, the DMZ tier1020 can include one or more load balancer (LB) subnet(s) 1022, acontrol plane app tier 1024 that can include app subnet(s) 1026, acontrol plane data tier 1028 that can include database (DB) subnet(s)1030 (e.g., frontend DB subnet(s) and/or backend DB subnet(s)). The LBsubnet(s) 1022 contained in the control plane DMZ tier 1020 can becommunicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) 1026 contained in thecontrol plane app tier 1024 and an Internet gateway 1034 that can becontained in the control plane VCN 1016, and the app subnet(s) 1026 canbe communicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) 1030 contained in thecontrol plane data tier 1028 and a service gateway 1036 and a networkaddress translation (NAT) gateway 1038. The control plane VCN 1016 caninclude the service gateway 1036 and the NAT gateway 1038.

The control plane VCN 1016 can include a data plane mirror app tier 1040that can include app subnet(s) 1026. The app subnet(s) 1026 contained inthe data plane mirror app tier 1040 can include a virtual networkinterface controller (VNIC) 1042 that can execute a compute instance1044. The compute instance 1044 can communicatively couple the appsubnet(s) 1026 of the data plane mirror app tier 1040 to app subnet(s)1026 that can be contained in a data plane app tier 1046.

The data plane VCN 1018 can include the data plane app tier 1046, a dataplane DMZ tier 1048, and a data plane data tier 1050. The data plane DMZtier 1048 can include LB subnet(s) 1022 that can be communicativelycoupled to the app subnet(s) 1026 of the data plane app tier 1046 andthe Internet gateway 1034 of the data plane VCN 1018. The app subnet(s)1026 can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway 1036 of thedata plane VCN 1018 and the NAT gateway 1038 of the data plane VCN 1018.The data plane data tier 1050 can also include the DB subnet(s) 1030that can be communicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) 1026 of thedata plane app tier 1046.

The Internet gateway 1034 of the control plane VCN 1016 and of the dataplane VCN 1018 can be communicatively coupled to a metadata managementservice 1052 that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet1054. Public Internet 1054 can be communicatively coupled to the NATgateway 1038 of the control plane VCN 1016 and of the data plane VCN1018. The service gateway 1036 of the control plane VCN 1016 and of thedata plane VCN 1018 can be communicatively couple to cloud services1056.

In some examples, the service gateway 1036 of the control plane VCN 1016or of the data plan VCN 1018 can make application programming interface(API) calls to cloud services 1056 without going through public Internet1054. The API calls to cloud services 1056 from the service gateway 1036can be one-way: the service gateway 1036 can make API calls to cloudservices 1056, and cloud services 1056 can send requested data to theservice gateway 1036. But, cloud services 1056 may not initiate APIcalls to the service gateway 1036.

In some examples, the secure host tenancy 1004 can be directly connectedto the service tenancy 1019, which may be otherwise isolated. The securehost subnet 1008 can communicate with the SSH subnet 1014 through an LPG1010 that may enable two-way communication over an otherwise isolatedsystem. Connecting the secure host subnet 1008 to the SSH subnet 1014may give the secure host subnet 1008 access to other entities within theservice tenancy 1019.

The control plane VCN 1016 may allow users of the service tenancy 1019to set up or otherwise provision desired resources. Desired resourcesprovisioned in the control plane VCN 1016 may be deployed or otherwiseused in the data plane VCN 1018. In some examples, the control plane VCN1016 can be isolated from the data plane VCN 1018, and the data planemirror app tier 1040 of the control plane VCN 1016 can communicate withthe data plane app tier 1046 of the data plane VCN 1018 via VNICs 1042that can be contained in the data plane mirror app tier 1040 and thedata plane app tier 1046.

In some examples, users of the system, or customers, can make requests,for example create, read, update, or delete (CRUD) operations, throughpublic Internet 1054 that can communicate the requests to the metadatamanagement service 1052. The metadata management service 1052 cancommunicate the request to the control plane VCN 1016 through theInternet gateway 1034. The request can be received by the LB subnet(s)1022 contained in the control plane DMZ tier 1020. The LB subnet(s) 1022may determine that the request is valid, and in response to thisdetermination, the LB subnet(s) 1022 can transmit the request to appsubnet(s) 1026 contained in the control plane app tier 1024. If therequest is validated and requires a call to public Internet 1054, thecall to public Internet 1054 may be transmitted to the NAT gateway 1038that can make the call to public Internet 1054. Memory that may bedesired to be stored by the request can be stored in the DB subnet(s)1030.

In some examples, the data plane mirror app tier 1040 can facilitatedirect communication between the control plane VCN 1016 and the dataplane VCN 1018. For example, changes, updates, or other suitablemodifications to configuration may be desired to be applied to theresources contained in the data plane VCN 1018. Via a VNIC 1042, thecontrol plane VCN 1016 can directly communicate with, and can therebyexecute the changes, updates, or other suitable modifications toconfiguration to, resources contained in the data plane VCN 1018.

In some embodiments, the control plane VCN 1016 and the data plane VCN1018 can be contained in the service tenancy 1019. In this case, theuser, or the customer, of the system may not own or operate either thecontrol plane VCN 1016 or the data plane VCN 1018. Instead, the IaaSprovider may own or operate the control plane VCN 1016 and the dataplane VCN 1018, both of which may be contained in the service tenancy1019. This embodiment can enable isolation of networks that may preventusers or customers from interacting with other users', or othercustomers', resources. Also, this embodiment may allow users orcustomers of the system to store databases privately without needing torely on public Internet 1054, which may not have a desired level ofsecurity, for storage.

In other embodiments, the LB subnet(s) 1022 contained in the controlplane VCN 1016 can be configured to receive a signal from the servicegateway 1036. In this embodiment, the control plane VCN 1016 and thedata plane VCN 1018 may be configured to be called by a customer of theIaaS provider without calling public Internet 1054. Customers of theIaaS provider may desire this embodiment since database(s) that thecustomers use may be controlled by the IaaS provider and may be storedon the service tenancy 1019, which may be isolated from public Internet1054.

FIG. 11 is a block diagram 1100 illustrating another example pattern ofan IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. Serviceoperators 1102 (e.g. service operators 1002 of FIG. 10 ) can becommunicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy 1104 (e.g. the securehost tenancy 1004 of FIG. 10 ) that can include a virtual cloud network(VCN) 1106 (e.g. the VCN 1006 of FIG. 10 ) and a secure host subnet 1108(e.g. the secure host subnet 1008 of FIG. 10 ). The VCN 1106 can includea local peering gateway (LPG) 1110 (e.g. the LPG 1010 of FIG. 10 ) thatcan be communicatively coupled to a secure shell (SSH) VCN 1112 (e.g.the SSH VCN 1012 of FIG. 10 ) via an LPG 1010 contained in the SSH VCN1112. The SSH VCN 1112 can include an SSH subnet 1114 (e.g. the SSHsubnet 1014 of FIG. 10 ), and the SSH VCN 1112 can be communicativelycoupled to a control plane VCN 1116 (e.g. the control plane VCN 1016 ofFIG. 10 ) via an LPG 1110 contained in the control plane VCN 1116. Thecontrol plane VCN 1116 can be contained in a service tenancy 1119 (e.g.the service tenancy 1019 of FIG. 10 ), and the data plane VCN 1118 (e.g.the data plane VCN 1018 of FIG. 10 ) can be contained in a customertenancy 1121 that may be owned or operated by users, or customers, ofthe system.

The control plane VCN 1116 can include a control plane DMZ tier 1120(e.g. the control plane DMZ tier 1020 of FIG. 10 ) that can include LBsubnet(s) 1122 (e.g. LB subnet(s) 1022 of FIG. 10 ), a control plane apptier 1124 (e.g. the control plane app tier 1024 of FIG. 10 ) that caninclude app subnet(s) 1126 (e.g. app subnet(s) 1026 of FIG. 10 ), acontrol plane data tier 1128 (e.g. the control plane data tier 1028 ofFIG. 10 ) that can include database (DB) subnet(s) 1130 (e.g. similar toDB subnet(s) 1030 of FIG. 10 ). The LB subnet(s) 1122 contained in thecontrol plane DMZ tier 1120 can be communicatively coupled to the appsubnet(s) 1126 contained in the control plane app tier 1124 and anInternet gateway 1134 (e.g. the Internet gateway 1034 of FIG. 10 ) thatcan be contained in the control plane VCN 1116, and the app subnet(s)1126 can be communicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) 1130 containedin the control plane data tier 1128 and a service gateway 1136 (e.g. theservice gateway of FIG. 10 ) and a network address translation (NAT)gateway 1138 (e.g. the NAT gateway 1038 of FIG. 10 ). The control planeVCN 1116 can include the service gateway 1136 and the NAT gateway 1138.

The control plane VCN 1116 can include a data plane mirror app tier 1140(e.g. the data plane mirror app tier 1040 of FIG. 10 ) that can includeapp subnet(s) 1126. The app subnet(s) 1126 contained in the data planemirror app tier 1140 can include a virtual network interface controller(VNIC) 1142 (e.g. the VNIC of 1042) that can execute a compute instance1144 (e.g. similar to the compute instance 1044 of FIG. 10 ). Thecompute instance 1144 can facilitate communication between the appsubnet(s) 1126 of the data plane mirror app tier 1140 and the appsubnet(s) 1126 that can be contained in a data plane app tier 1146 (e.g.the data plane app tier 1046 of FIG. 10 ) via the VNIC 1142 contained inthe data plane mirror app tier 1140 and the VNIC 1142 contained in thedata plan app tier 1146.

The Internet gateway 1134 contained in the control plane VCN 1116 can becommunicatively coupled to a metadata management service 1152 (e.g. themetadata management service 1052 of FIG. 10 ) that can becommunicatively coupled to public Internet 1154 (e.g. public Internet1054 of FIG. 10 ). Public Internet 1154 can be communicatively coupledto the NAT gateway 1138 contained in the control plane VCN 1116. Theservice gateway 1136 contained in the control plane VCN 1116 can becommunicatively couple to cloud services 1156 (e.g. cloud services 1056of FIG. 10 ).

In some examples, the data plane VCN 1118 can be contained in thecustomer tenancy 1121. In this case, the IaaS provider may provide thecontrol plane VCN 1116 for each customer, and the IaaS provider may, foreach customer, set up a unique compute instance 1144 that is containedin the service tenancy 1119. Each compute instance 1144 may allowcommunication between the control plane VCN 1116, contained in theservice tenancy 1119, and the data plane VCN 1118 that is contained inthe customer tenancy 1121. The compute instance 1144 may allowresources, that are provisioned in the control plane VCN 1116 that iscontained in the service tenancy 1119, to be deployed or otherwise usedin the data plane VCN 1118 that is contained in the customer tenancy1121.

In other examples, the customer of the IaaS provider may have databasesthat live in the customer tenancy 1121. In this example, the controlplane VCN 1116 can include the data plane mirror app tier 1140 that caninclude app subnet(s) 1126. The data plane mirror app tier 1140 canreside in the data plane VCN 1118, but the data plane mirror app tier1140 may not live in the data plane VCN 1118. That is, the data planemirror app tier 1140 may have access to the customer tenancy 1121, butthe data plane mirror app tier 1140 may not exist in the data plane VCN1118 or be owned or operated by the customer of the IaaS provider. Thedata plane mirror app tier 1140 may be configured to make calls to thedata plane VCN 1118 but may not be configured to make calls to anyentity contained in the control plane VCN 1116. The customer may desireto deploy or otherwise use resources in the data plane VCN 1118 that areprovisioned in the control plane VCN 1116, and the data plane mirror apptier 1140 can facilitate the desired deployment, or other usage ofresources, of the customer.

In some embodiments, the customer of the IaaS provider can apply filtersto the data plane VCN 1118. In this embodiment, the customer candetermine what the data plane VCN 1118 can access, and the customer mayrestrict access to public Internet 1154 from the data plane VCN 1118.The IaaS provider may not be able to apply filters or otherwise controlaccess of the data plane VCN 1118 to any outside networks or databases.Applying filters and controls by the customer onto the data plane VCN1118, contained in the customer tenancy 1121, can help isolate the dataplane VCN 1118 from other customers and from public Internet 1154.

In some embodiments, cloud services 1156 can be called by the servicegateway 1136 to access services that may not exist on public Internet1154, on the control plane VCN 1116, or on the data plane VCN 1118. Theconnection between cloud services 1156 and the control plane VCN 1116 orthe data plane VCN 1118 may not be live or continuous. Cloud services1156 may exist on a different network owned or operated by the IaaSprovider. Cloud services 1156 may be configured to receive calls fromthe service gateway 1136 and may be configured to not receive calls frompublic Internet 1154. Some cloud services 1156 may be isolated fromother cloud services 1156, and the control plane VCN 1116 may beisolated from cloud services 1156 that may not be in the same region asthe control plane VCN 1116. For example, the control plane VCN 1116 maybe located in “Region 1,” and cloud service “Deployment 10,” may belocated in Region 1 and in “Region 2.” If a call to Deployment 10 ismade by the service gateway 1136 contained in the control plane VCN 1116located in Region 1, the call may be transmitted to Deployment 10 inRegion 1. In this example, the control plane VCN 1116, or Deployment 10in Region 1, may not be communicatively coupled to, or otherwise incommunication with, Deployment 10 in Region 2.

FIG. 12 is a block diagram 1200 illustrating another example pattern ofan IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. Serviceoperators 1202 (e.g. service operators 1002 of FIG. 10 ) can becommunicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy 1204 (e.g. the securehost tenancy 1004 of FIG. 10 ) that can include a virtual cloud network(VCN) 1206 (e.g. the VCN 1006 of FIG. 10 ) and a secure host subnet 1208(e.g. the secure host subnet 1008 of FIG. 10 ). The VCN 1206 can includean LPG 1210 (e.g. the LPG 1010 of FIG. 10 ) that can be communicativelycoupled to an SSH VCN 1212 (e.g. the SSH VCN 1012 of FIG. 10 ) via anLPG 1210 contained in the SSH VCN 1212. The SSH VCN 1212 can include anSSH subnet 1214 (e.g. the SSH subnet 1014 of FIG. 10 ), and the SSH VCN1212 can be communicatively coupled to a control plane VCN 1216 (e.g.the control plane VCN 1016 of FIG. 10 ) via an LPG 1210 contained in thecontrol plane VCN 1216 and to a data plane VCN 1218 (e.g. the data plane1018 of FIG. 10 ) via an LPG 1210 contained in the data plane VCN 1218.The control plane VCN 1216 and the data plane VCN 1218 can be containedin a service tenancy 1219 (e.g. the service tenancy 1019 of FIG. 10 ).

The control plane VCN 1216 can include a control plane DMZ tier 1220(e.g. the control plane DMZ tier 1020 of FIG. 10 ) that can include loadbalancer (LB) subnet(s) 1222 (e.g. LB subnet(s) 1022 of FIG. 10 ), acontrol plane app tier 1224 (e.g. the control plane app tier 1024 ofFIG. 10 ) that can include app subnet(s) 1226 (e.g. similar to appsubnet(s) 1026 of FIG. 10 ), a control plane data tier 1228 (e.g. thecontrol plane data tier 1028 of FIG. 10 ) that can include DB subnet(s)1230. The LB subnet(s) 1222 contained in the control plane DMZ tier 1220can be communicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) 1226 contained inthe control plane app tier 1224 and to an Internet gateway 1234 (e.g.the Internet gateway 1034 of FIG. 10 ) that can be contained in thecontrol plane VCN 1216, and the app subnet(s) 1226 can becommunicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) 1230 contained in thecontrol plane data tier 1228 and to a service gateway 1236 (e.g. theservice gateway of FIG. 10 ) and a network address translation (NAT)gateway 1238 (e.g. the NAT gateway 1038 of FIG. 10 ). The control planeVCN 1216 can include the service gateway 1236 and the NAT gateway 1238.

The data plane VCN 1218 can include a data plane app tier 1246 (e.g. thedata plane app tier 1046 of FIG. 10 ), a data plane DMZ tier 1248 (e.g.the data plane DMZ tier 1048 of FIG. 10 ), and a data plane data tier1250 (e.g. the data plane data tier 1050 of FIG. 10 ). The data planeDMZ tier 1248 can include LB subnet(s) 1222 that can be communicativelycoupled to trusted app subnet(s) 1260 and untrusted app subnet(s) 1262of the data plane app tier 1246 and the Internet gateway 1234 containedin the data plane VCN 1218. The trusted app subnet(s) 1260 can becommunicatively coupled to the service gateway 1236 contained in thedata plane VCN 1218, the NAT gateway 1238 contained in the data planeVCN 1218, and DB subnet(s) 1230 contained in the data plane data tier1250. The untrusted app subnet(s) 1262 can be communicatively coupled tothe service gateway 1236 contained in the data plane VCN 1218 and DBsubnet(s) 1230 contained in the data plane data tier 1250. The dataplane data tier 1250 can include DB subnet(s) 1230 that can becommunicatively coupled to the service gateway 1236 contained in thedata plane VCN 1218.

The untrusted app subnet(s) 1262 can include one or more primary VNICs1264(1)-(N) that can be communicatively coupled to tenant virtualmachines (VMs) 1266(1)-(N). Each tenant VM 1266(1)-(N) can becommunicatively coupled to a respective app subnet 1267(1)-(N) that canbe contained in respective container egress VCNs 1268(1)-(N) that can becontained in respective customer tenancies 1270(1)-(N). Respectivesecondary VNICs 1272(1)-(N) can facilitate communication between theuntrusted app subnet(s) 1262 contained in the data plane VCN 1218 andthe app subnet contained in the container egress VCNs 1268(1)-(N). Eachcontainer egress VCNs 1268(1)-(N) can include a NAT gateway 1238 thatcan be communicatively coupled to public Internet 1254 (e.g. publicInternet 1054 of FIG. 10 ).

The Internet gateway 1234 contained in the control plane VCN 1216 andcontained in the data plane VCN 1218 can be communicatively coupled to ametadata management service 1252 (e.g. the metadata management system1052 of FIG. 10 ) that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet1254. Public Internet 1254 can be communicatively coupled to the NATgateway 1238 contained in the control plane VCN 1216 and contained inthe data plane VCN 1218. The service gateway 1236 contained in thecontrol plane VCN 1216 and contained in the data plane VCN 1218 can becommunicatively couple to cloud services 1256.

In some embodiments, the data plane VCN 1218 can be integrated withcustomer tenancies 1270. This integration can be useful or desirable forcustomers of the IaaS provider in some cases such as a case that maydesire support when executing code. The customer may provide code to runthat may be destructive, may communicate with other customer resources,or may otherwise cause undesirable effects. In response to this, theIaaS provider may determine whether to run code given to the IaaSprovider by the customer.

In some examples, the customer of the IaaS provider may grant temporarynetwork access to the IaaS provider and request a function to beattached to the data plane tier app 1246. Code to run the function maybe executed in the VMs 1266(1)-(N), and the code may not be configuredto run anywhere else on the data plane VCN 1218. Each VM 1266(1)-(N) maybe connected to one customer tenancy 1270. Respective containers1271(1)-(N) contained in the VMs 1266(1)-(N) may be configured to runthe code. In this case, there can be a dual isolation (e.g., thecontainers 1271(1)-(N) running code, where the containers 1271(1)-(N)may be contained in at least the VM 1266(1)-(N) that are contained inthe untrusted app subnet(s) 1262), which may help prevent incorrect orotherwise undesirable code from damaging the network of the IaaSprovider or from damaging a network of a different customer. Thecontainers 1271(1)-(N) may be communicatively coupled to the customertenancy 1270 and may be configured to transmit or receive data from thecustomer tenancy 1270. The containers 1271(1)-(N) may not be configuredto transmit or receive data from any other entity in the data plane VCN1218. Upon completion of running the code, the IaaS provider may kill orotherwise dispose of the containers 1271(1)-(N).

In some embodiments, the trusted app subnet(s) 1260 may run code thatmay be owned or operated by the IaaS provider. In this embodiment, thetrusted app subnet(s) 1260 may be communicatively coupled to the DBsubnet(s) 1230 and be configured to execute CRUD operations in the DBsubnet(s) 1230. The untrusted app subnet(s) 1262 may be communicativelycoupled to the DB subnet(s) 1230, but in this embodiment, the untrustedapp subnet(s) may be configured to execute read operations in the DBsubnet(s) 1230. The containers 1271(1)-(N) that can be contained in theVM 1266(1)-(N) of each customer and that may run code from the customermay not be communicatively coupled with the DB subnet(s) 1230.

In other embodiments, the control plane VCN 1216 and the data plane VCN1218 may not be directly communicatively coupled. In this embodiment,there may be no direct communication between the control plane VCN 1216and the data plane VCN 1218. However, communication can occur indirectlythrough at least one method. An LPG 1210 may be established by the IaaSprovider that can facilitate communication between the control plane VCN1216 and the data plane VCN 1218. In another example, the control planeVCN 1216 or the data plane VCN 1218 can make a call to cloud services1256 via the service gateway 1236. For example, a call to cloud services1256 from the control plane VCN 1216 can include a request for a servicethat can communicate with the data plane VCN 1218.

FIG. 13 is a block diagram 1300 illustrating another example pattern ofan IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. Serviceoperators 1302 (e.g. service operators 1002 of FIG. 10 ) can becommunicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy 1304 (e.g. the securehost tenancy 1004 of FIG. 10 ) that can include a virtual cloud network(VCN) 1306 (e.g. the VCN 1006 of FIG. 10 ) and a secure host subnet 1308(e.g. the secure host subnet 1008 of FIG. 10 ). The VCN 1306 can includean LPG 1310 (e.g. the LPG 1010 of FIG. 10 ) that can be communicativelycoupled to an SSH VCN 1312 (e.g. the SSH VCN 1012 of FIG. 10 ) via anLPG 1310 contained in the SSH VCN 1312. The SSH VCN 1312 can include anSSH subnet 1314 (e.g. the SSH subnet 1014 of FIG. 10 ), and the SSH VCN1312 can be communicatively coupled to a control plane VCN 1316 (e.g.the control plane VCN 1016 of FIG. 10 ) via an LPG 1310 contained in thecontrol plane VCN 1316 and to a data plane VCN 1318 (e.g. the data plane1018 of FIG. 10 ) via an LPG 1310 contained in the data plane VCN 1318.The control plane VCN 1316 and the data plane VCN 1318 can be containedin a service tenancy 1319 (e.g. the service tenancy 1019 of FIG. 10 ).

The control plane VCN 1316 can include a control plane DMZ tier 1320(e.g. the control plane DMZ tier 1020 of FIG. 10 ) that can include LBsubnet(s) 1322 (e.g. LB subnet(s) 1022 of FIG. 10 ), a control plane apptier 1324 (e.g. the control plane app tier 1024 of FIG. 10 ) that caninclude app subnet(s) 1326 (e.g. app subnet(s) 1026 of FIG. 10 ), acontrol plane data tier 1328 (e.g. the control plane data tier 1028 ofFIG. 10 ) that can include DB subnet(s) 1330 (e.g. DB subnet(s) 1230 ofFIG. 12 ). The LB subnet(s) 1322 contained in the control plane DMZ tier1320 can be communicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) 1326 containedin the control plane app tier 1324 and to an Internet gateway 1334 (e.g.the Internet gateway 1034 of FIG. 10 ) that can be contained in thecontrol plane VCN 1316, and the app subnet(s) 1326 can becommunicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) 1330 contained in thecontrol plane data tier 1328 and to a service gateway 1336 (e.g. theservice gateway of FIG. 10 ) and a network address translation (NAT)gateway 1338 (e.g. the NAT gateway 1038 of FIG. 10 ). The control planeVCN 1316 can include the service gateway 1336 and the NAT gateway 1338.

The data plane VCN 1318 can include a data plane app tier 1346 (e.g. thedata plane app tier 1046 of FIG. 10 ), a data plane DMZ tier 1348 (e.g.the data plane DMZ tier 1048 of FIG. 10 ), and a data plane data tier1350 (e.g. the data plane data tier 1050 of FIG. 10 ). The data planeDMZ tier 1348 can include LB subnet(s) 1322 that can be communicativelycoupled to trusted app subnet(s) 1360 (e.g. trusted app subnet(s) 1260of FIG. 12 ) and untrusted app subnet(s) 1362 (e.g. untrusted appsubnet(s) 1262 of FIG. 12 ) of the data plane app tier 1346 and theInternet gateway 1334 contained in the data plane VCN 1318. The trustedapp subnet(s) 1360 can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway1336 contained in the data plane VCN 1318, the NAT gateway 1338contained in the data plane VCN 1318, and DB subnet(s) 1330 contained inthe data plane data tier 1350. The untrusted app subnet(s) 1362 can becommunicatively coupled to the service gateway 1336 contained in thedata plane VCN 1318 and DB subnet(s) 1330 contained in the data planedata tier 1350. The data plane data tier 1350 can include DB subnet(s)1330 that can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway 1336contained in the data plane VCN 1318.

The untrusted app subnet(s) 1362 can include primary VNICs 1364(1)-(N)that can be communicatively coupled to tenant virtual machines (VMs)1366(1)-(N) residing within the untrusted app subnet(s) 1362. Eachtenant VM 1366(1)-(N) can run code in a respective container1367(1)-(N), and be communicatively coupled to an app subnet 1326 thatcan be contained in a data plane app tier 1346 that can be contained ina container egress VCN 1368. Respective secondary VNICs 1372(1)-(N) canfacilitate communication between the untrusted app subnet(s) 1362contained in the data plane VCN 1318 and the app subnet contained in thecontainer egress VCN 1368. The container egress VCN can include a NATgateway 1338 that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet 1354(e.g. public Internet 1054 of FIG. 10 ).

The Internet gateway 1334 contained in the control plane VCN 1316 andcontained in the data plane VCN 1318 can be communicatively coupled to ametadata management service 1352 (e.g. the metadata management system1052 of FIG. 10 ) that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet1354. Public Internet 1354 can be communicatively coupled to the NATgateway 1338 contained in the control plane VCN 1316 and contained inthe data plane VCN 1318. The service gateway 1336 contained in thecontrol plane VCN 1316 and contained in the data plane VCN 1318 can becommunicatively couple to cloud services 1356.

In some examples, the pattern illustrated by the architecture of blockdiagram 1300 of FIG. 13 may be considered an exception to the patternillustrated by the architecture of block diagram 1200 of FIG. 12 and maybe desirable for a customer of the IaaS provider if the IaaS providercannot directly communicate with the customer (e.g., a disconnectedregion). The respective containers 1367(1)-(N) that are contained in theVMs 1366(1)-(N) for each customer can be accessed in real-time by thecustomer. The containers 1367(1)-(N) may be configured to make calls torespective secondary VNICs 1372(1)-(N) contained in app subnet(s) 1326of the data plane app tier 1346 that can be contained in the containeregress VCN 1368. The secondary VNICs 1372(1)-(N) can transmit the callsto the NAT gateway 1338 that may transmit the calls to public Internet1354. In this example, the containers 1367(1)-(N) that can be accessedin real-time by the customer can be isolated from the control plane VCN1316 and can be isolated from other entities contained in the data planeVCN 1318. The containers 1367(1)-(N) may also be isolated from resourcesfrom other customers.

In other examples, the customer can use the containers 1367(1)-(N) tocall cloud services 1356. In this example, the customer may run code inthe containers 1367(1)-(N) that requests a service from cloud services1356. The containers 1367(1)-(N) can transmit this request to thesecondary VNICs 1372(1)-(N) that can transmit the request to the NATgateway that can transmit the request to public Internet 1354. PublicInternet 1354 can transmit the request to LB subnet(s) 1322 contained inthe control plane VCN 1316 via the Internet gateway 1334. In response todetermining the request is valid, the LB subnet(s) can transmit therequest to app subnet(s) 1326 that can transmit the request to cloudservices 1356 via the service gateway 1336.

It should be appreciated that IaaS architectures 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300depicted in the figures may have other components than those depicted.Further, the embodiments shown in the figures are only some examples ofa cloud infrastructure system that may incorporate an embodiment of thedisclosure. In some other embodiments, the IaaS systems may have more orfewer components than shown in the figures, may combine two or morecomponents, or may have a different configuration or arrangement ofcomponents.

In certain embodiments, the IaaS systems described herein may include asuite of applications, middleware, and database service offerings thatare delivered to a customer in a self-service, subscription-based,elastically scalable, reliable, highly available, and secure manner. Anexample of such an IaaS system is the Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI)provided by the present assignee.

FIG. 14 illustrates an example computer system 1400, in which variousembodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented. The system1400 may be used to implement any of the computer systems describedabove. As shown in the figure, computer system 1400 includes aprocessing unit 1404 that communicates with a number of peripheralsubsystems via a bus subsystem 1402. These peripheral subsystems mayinclude a processing acceleration unit 1406, an I/O subsystem 1408, astorage subsystem 1418 and a communications subsystem 1424. Storagesubsystem 1418 includes tangible computer-readable storage media 1422and a system memory 1410.

Bus subsystem 1402 provides a mechanism for letting the variouscomponents and subsystems of computer system 1400 communicate with eachother as intended. Although bus subsystem 1402 is shown schematically asa single bus, alternative embodiments of the bus subsystem may utilizemultiple buses. Bus subsystem 1402 may be any of several types of busstructures including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheralbus, and a local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures. Forexample, such architectures may include an Industry StandardArchitecture (ISA) bus, Micro Channel Architecture (MCA) bus, EnhancedISA (EISA) bus, Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) localbus, and Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus, which can beimplemented as a Mezzanine bus manufactured to the IEEE P1386.1standard.

Processing unit 1404, which can be implemented as one or more integratedcircuits (e.g., a conventional microprocessor or microcontroller),controls the operation of computer system 1400. One or more processorsmay be included in processing unit 1404. These processors may includesingle core or multicore processors. In certain embodiments, processingunit 1404 may be implemented as one or more independent processing units1432 and/or 1434 with single or multicore processors included in eachprocessing unit. In other embodiments, processing unit 1404 may also beimplemented as a quad-core processing unit formed by integrating twodual-core processors into a single chip.

In various embodiments, processing unit 1404 can execute a variety ofprograms in response to program code and can maintain multipleconcurrently executing programs or processes. At any given time, some orall of the program code to be executed can be resident in processor(s)1404 and/or in storage subsystem 1418. Through suitable programming,processor(s) 1404 can provide various functionalities described above.Computer system 1400 may additionally include a processing accelerationunit 1406, which can include a digital signal processor (DSP), aspecial-purpose processor, and/or the like.

I/O subsystem 1408 may include user interface input devices and userinterface output devices. User interface input devices may include akeyboard, pointing devices such as a mouse or trackball, a touchpad ortouch screen incorporated into a display, a scroll wheel, a click wheel,a dial, a button, a switch, a keypad, audio input devices with voicecommand recognition systems, microphones, and other types of inputdevices. User interface input devices may include, for example, motionsensing and/or gesture recognition devices such as the Microsoft Kinect®motion sensor that enables users to control and interact with an inputdevice, such as the Microsoft Xbox® 360 game controller, through anatural user interface using gestures and spoken commands. Userinterface input devices may also include eye gesture recognition devicessuch as the Google Glass® blink detector that detects eye activity(e.g., ‘blinking’ while taking pictures and/or making a menu selection)from users and transforms the eye gestures as input into an input device(e.g., Google Glass®). Additionally, user interface input devices mayinclude voice recognition sensing devices that enable users to interactwith voice recognition systems (e.g., Siri® navigator), through voicecommands.

User interface input devices may also include, without limitation, threedimensional (3D) mice, joysticks or pointing sticks, gamepads andgraphic tablets, and audio/visual devices such as speakers, digitalcameras, digital camcorders, portable media players, webcams, imagescanners, fingerprint scanners, barcode reader 3D scanners, 3D printers,laser rangefinders, and eye gaze tracking devices. Additionally, userinterface input devices may include, for example, medical imaging inputdevices such as computed tomography, magnetic resonance imaging,position emission tomography, medical ultrasonography devices. Userinterface input devices may also include, for example, audio inputdevices such as MIDI keyboards, digital musical instruments and thelike.

User interface output devices may include a display subsystem, indicatorlights, or non-visual displays such as audio output devices, etc. Thedisplay subsystem may be a cathode ray tube (CRT), a flat-panel device,such as that using a liquid crystal display (LCD) or plasma display, aprojection device, a touch screen, and the like. In general, use of theterm “output device” is intended to include all possible types ofdevices and mechanisms for outputting information from computer system1400 to a user or other computer. For example, user interface outputdevices may include, without limitation, a variety of display devicesthat visually convey text, graphics and audio/video information such asmonitors, printers, speakers, headphones, automotive navigation systems,plotters, voice output devices, and modems.

Computer system 1400 may comprise a storage subsystem 1418 thatcomprises software elements, shown as being currently located within asystem memory 1410. System memory 1410 may store program instructionsthat are loadable and executable on processing unit 1404, as well asdata generated during the execution of these programs.

Depending on the configuration and type of computer system 1400, systemmemory 1410 may be volatile (such as random access memory (RAM)) and/ornon-volatile (such as read-only memory (ROM), flash memory, etc.) TheRAM typically contains data and/or program modules that are immediatelyaccessible to and/or presently being operated and executed by processingunit 1404. In some implementations, system memory 1410 may includemultiple different types of memory, such as static random access memory(SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM). In some implementations,a basic input/output system (BIOS), containing the basic routines thathelp to transfer information between elements within computer system1400, such as during start-up, may typically be stored in the ROM. Byway of example, and not limitation, system memory 1410 also illustratesapplication programs 1412, which may include client applications, Webbrowsers, mid-tier applications, relational database management systems(RDBMS), etc., program data 1414, and an operating system 1416. By wayof example, operating system 1416 may include various versions ofMicrosoft Windows®, Apple Macintosh®, and/or Linux operating systems, avariety of commercially-available UNIX® or UNIX-like operating systems(including without limitation the variety of GNU/Linux operatingsystems, the Google Chrome® OS, and the like) and/or mobile operatingsystems such as iOS, Windows® Phone, Android® OS, BlackBerry® 14 OS, andPalm® OS operating systems.

Storage subsystem 1418 may also provide a tangible computer-readablestorage medium for storing the basic programming and data constructsthat provide the functionality of some embodiments. Software (programs,code modules, instructions) that when executed by a processor providethe functionality described above may be stored in storage subsystem1418. These software modules or instructions may be executed byprocessing unit 1404. Storage subsystem 1418 may also provide arepository for storing data used in accordance with the presentdisclosure.

Storage subsystem 1400 may also include a computer-readable storagemedia reader 1420 that can further be connected to computer-readablestorage media 1422. Together and, optionally, in combination with systemmemory 1410, computer-readable storage media 1422 may comprehensivelyrepresent remote, local, fixed, and/or removable storage devices plusstorage media for temporarily and/or more permanently containing,storing, transmitting, and retrieving computer-readable information.

Computer-readable storage media 1422 containing code, or portions ofcode, can also include any appropriate media known or used in the art,including storage media and communication media, such as but not limitedto, volatile and non-volatile, removable and non-removable mediaimplemented in any method or technology for storage and/or transmissionof information. This can include tangible computer-readable storagemedia such as RAM, ROM, electronically erasable programmable ROM(EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digitalversatile disk (DVD), or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes,magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices,or other tangible computer readable media. This can also includenontangible computer-readable media, such as data signals, datatransmissions, or any other medium which can be used to transmit thedesired information and which can be accessed by computing system 1400.

By way of example, computer-readable storage media 1422 may include ahard disk drive that reads from or writes to non-removable, nonvolatilemagnetic media, a magnetic disk drive that reads from or writes to aremovable, nonvolatile magnetic disk, and an optical disk drive thatreads from or writes to a removable, nonvolatile optical disk such as aCD ROM, DVD, and Blu-Ray® disk, or other optical media.Computer-readable storage media 1422 may include, but is not limited to,Zip® drives, flash memory cards, universal serial bus (USB) flashdrives, secure digital (SD) cards, DVD disks, digital video tape, andthe like. Computer-readable storage media 1422 may also include,solid-state drives (SSD) based on non-volatile memory such asflash-memory based SSDs, enterprise flash drives, solid state ROM, andthe like, SSDs based on volatile memory such as solid state RAM, dynamicRAM, static RAM, DRAM-based SSDs, magnetoresistive RAM (MRAM) SSDs, andhybrid SSDs that use a combination of DRAM and flash memory based SSDs.The disk drives and their associated computer-readable media may providenon-volatile storage of computer-readable instructions, data structures,program modules, and other data for computer system 1400.

Communications subsystem 1424 provides an interface to other computersystems and networks. Communications subsystem 1424 serves as aninterface for receiving data from and transmitting data to other systemsfrom computer system 1400. For example, communications subsystem 1424may enable computer system 1400 to connect to one or more devices viathe Internet. In some embodiments communications subsystem 1424 caninclude radio frequency (RF) transceiver components for accessingwireless voice and/or data networks (e.g., using cellular telephonetechnology, advanced data network technology, such as 3G, 4G or EDGE(enhanced data rates for global evolution), WiFi (IEEE 802.11 familystandards, or other mobile communication technologies, or anycombination thereof), global positioning system (GPS) receivercomponents, and/or other components. In some embodiments communicationssubsystem 1424 can provide wired network connectivity (e.g., Ethernet)in addition to or instead of a wireless interface.

In some embodiments, communications subsystem 1424 may also receiveinput communication in the form of structured and/or unstructured datafeeds 1426, event streams 1428, event updates 1430, and the like onbehalf of one or more users who may use computer system 1400.

By way of example, communications subsystem 1424 may be configured toreceive data feeds 1426 in real-time from users of social networksand/or other communication services such as Twitter® feeds, Facebook®updates, web feeds such as Rich Site Summary (RSS) feeds, and/orreal-time updates from one or more third party information sources.

Additionally, communications subsystem 1424 may also be configured toreceive data in the form of continuous data streams, which may includeevent streams 1428 of real-time events and/or event updates 1430, thatmay be continuous or unbounded in nature with no explicit end. Examplesof applications that generate continuous data may include, for example,sensor data applications, financial tickers, network performancemeasuring tools (e.g. network monitoring and traffic managementapplications), clickstream analysis tools, automobile trafficmonitoring, and the like.

Communications subsystem 1424 may also be configured to output thestructured and/or unstructured data feeds 1426, event streams 1428,event updates 1430, and the like to one or more databases that may be incommunication with one or more streaming data source computers coupledto computer system 1400.

Computer system 1400 can be one of various types, including a handheldportable device (e.g., an iPhone® cellular phone, an iPad® computingtablet, a PDA), a wearable device (e.g., a Google Glass® head mounteddisplay), a PC, a workstation, a mainframe, a kiosk, a server rack, orany other data processing system.

Due to the ever-changing nature of computers and networks, thedescription of computer system 1400 depicted in the figure is intendedonly as a specific example. Many other configurations having more orfewer components than the system depicted in the figure are possible.For example, customized hardware might also be used and/or particularelements might be implemented in hardware, firmware, software (includingapplets), or a combination. Further, connection to other computingdevices, such as network input/output devices, may be employed. Based onthe disclosure and teachings provided herein, a person of ordinary skillin the art will appreciate other ways and/or methods to implement thevarious embodiments.

Although specific embodiments of the disclosure have been described,various modifications, alterations, alternative constructions, andequivalents are also encompassed within the scope of the disclosure.Embodiments of the present disclosure are not restricted to operationwithin certain specific data processing environments, but are free tooperate within a plurality of data processing environments.Additionally, although embodiments of the present disclosure have beendescribed using a particular series of transactions and steps, it shouldbe apparent to those skilled in the art that the scope of the presentdisclosure is not limited to the described series of transactions andsteps. Various features and aspects of the above-described embodimentsmay be used individually or jointly.

Further, while embodiments of the present disclosure have been describedusing a particular combination of hardware and software, it should berecognized that other combinations of hardware and software are alsowithin the scope of the present disclosure. Embodiments of the presentdisclosure may be implemented only in hardware, or only in software, orusing combinations thereof. The various processes described herein canbe implemented on the same processor or different processors in anycombination. Accordingly, where components or modules are described asbeing configured to perform certain operations, such configuration canbe accomplished, e.g., by designing electronic circuits to perform theoperation, by programming programmable electronic circuits (such asmicroprocessors) to perform the operation, or any combination thereof.Processes can communicate using a variety of techniques including butnot limited to conventional techniques for inter process communication,and different pairs of processes may use different techniques, or thesame pair of processes may use different techniques at different times.

The specification and drawings are, accordingly, to be regarded in anillustrative rather than a restrictive sense. It will, however, beevident that additions, subtractions, deletions, and other modificationsand changes may be made thereunto without departing from the broaderspirit and scope as set forth in the claims. Thus, although specificdisclosure embodiments have been described, these are not intended to belimiting. Various modifications and equivalents are within the scope ofthe following claims.

The use of the terms “a” and “an” and “the” and similar referents in thecontext of describing the disclosed embodiments (especially in thecontext of the following claims) are to be construed to cover both thesingular and the plural, unless otherwise indicated herein or clearlycontradicted by context. The terms “comprising,” “having,” “including,”and “containing” are to be construed as open-ended terms (i.e., meaning“including, but not limited to,”) unless otherwise noted. The term“connected” is to be construed as partly or wholly contained within,attached to, or joined together, even if there is something intervening.Recitation of ranges of values herein are merely intended to serve as ashorthand method of referring individually to each separate valuefalling within the range, unless otherwise indicated herein and eachseparate value is incorporated into the specification as if it wereindividually recited herein. All methods described herein can beperformed in any suitable order unless otherwise indicated herein orotherwise clearly contradicted by context. The use of any and allexamples, or exemplary language (e.g., “such as”) provided herein, isintended merely to better illuminate embodiments of the disclosure anddoes not pose a limitation on the scope of the disclosure unlessotherwise claimed. No language in the specification should be construedas indicating any non-claimed element as essential to the practice ofthe disclosure.

Disjunctive language such as the phrase “at least one of X, Y, or Z,”unless specifically stated otherwise, is intended to be understoodwithin the context as used in general to present that an item, term,etc., may be either X, Y, or Z, or any combination thereof (e.g., X, Y,and/or Z). Thus, such disjunctive language is not generally intended to,and should not, imply that certain embodiments require at least one ofX, at least one of Y, or at least one of Z to each be present.

Preferred embodiments of this disclosure are described herein, includingthe best mode known for carrying out the disclosure. Variations of thosepreferred embodiments may become apparent to those of ordinary skill inthe art upon reading the foregoing description. Those of ordinary skillshould be able to employ such variations as appropriate and thedisclosure may be practiced otherwise than as specifically describedherein. Accordingly, this disclosure includes all modifications andequivalents of the subject matter recited in the claims appended heretoas permitted by applicable law. Moreover, any combination of theabove-described elements in all possible variations thereof isencompassed by the disclosure unless otherwise indicated herein.

All references, including publications, patent applications, andpatents, cited herein are hereby incorporated by reference to the sameextent as if each reference were individually and specifically indicatedto be incorporated by reference and were set forth in its entiretyherein.

In the foregoing specification, aspects of the disclosure are describedwith reference to specific embodiments thereof, but those skilled in theart will recognize that the disclosure is not limited thereto. Variousfeatures and aspects of the above-described disclosure may be usedindividually or jointly. Further, embodiments can be utilized in anynumber of environments and applications beyond those described hereinwithout departing from the broader spirit and scope of thespecification. The specification and drawings are, accordingly, to beregarded as illustrative rather than restrictive.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method, comprising: receiving, by a sessionmanager service, a request to create a secure shell instance;authorizing, by the session manager service, the user device, theauthorizing comprising: receiving a login token comprising a useridentifier from the user device; requesting an authorization systempublic key from an authorization service; authenticating the user devicebased at least in part on decrypting the login token with theauthorization system public key; requesting a delegation token from theauthorization service at least in part by providing the user identifier,a resource identifier of a resource identified in the request, and anexpiration period of the request; and receiving the delegation tokenfrom the authorization service; creating, by the session managerservice, the secure shell instance; and providing, by the sessionmanager service, a signed nonce token, the shell identifier, and arouter address to the user device for connecting to the secure shellinstance.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the authorization service isconfigured to generate the delegation token upon authorizing access tothe resource identified in the request within the expiration period. 3.The method of claim 1, further comprising signing the nonce token,wherein signing the nonce token comprises: signing the nonce token usinga system private key of a public/private key pair held by the sessionmanager service; and providing a system public key of the public/privatekey pair to a secure shell router at the router address.
 4. The methodof claim 1, further comprising: storing the nonce token in a data store,wherein the nonce token comprises a key sequence; and ascertainingwhether the nonce token is valid, based at least in part on searchingthe data store on the key sequence; and removing the nonce token fromthe data store after a secure shell router establishes a secureconnection between the user device and the secure shell instance.
 5. Themethod of claim 1, further comprising: terminating the secure shellinstance following a period of inactivity or a termination of the secureconnection by the user device.
 6. The method of claim 1, furthercomprising configuring the secure shell instance, wherein configuringthe secure shell instance comprises: reserving a block volume; receivinga domain identifier corresponding to the block volume; allocating aninstance on the block volume using the domain identifier, the instancebeing allocated from a plurality of available instances; receiving theshell identifier corresponding to the instance; and installing aconfiguration file on the instance, the configuration file comprisingrequest information included in the request.
 7. The method of claim 1,wherein the secure shell instance runs a docker container, such that therequest comprises an instruction to execute a terminal on the dockercontainer.
 8. A computer system implementing a session manager service,comprising: one or more processors; a memory in communication with theone or more processors, the memory configured to storecomputer-executable instructions, wherein the one or more processors areconfigured to execute the computer-executable instructions to at least:receive a request to create a secure shell instance; authorize the userdevice, the authorizing comprising: receiving a login token comprising auser identifier from the user device; requesting an authorization systempublic key from an authorization service; authenticating the user devicebased at least in part on decrypting the login token with theauthorization system public key; requesting a delegation token from theauthorization service at least in part by providing the user identifier,a resource identifier of a resource identified in the request, and anexpiration period of the request; and receiving the delegation tokenfrom the authorization service; create the secure shell instance; andprovide a signed nonce token, the shell identifier, and a router addressto the user device for connecting to the secure shell instance.
 9. Thesystem of claim 8, wherein the authorization service is configured togenerate the delegation token upon authorizing access to the resourceidentified in the request within the expiration period.
 10. The systemof claim 8, wherein the one or more processors are further configured toexecute the computer-executable instructions to at least sign the noncetoken, and wherein signing the nonce token comprises: signing the noncetoken using a system private key of a public/private key pair held bythe session manager service; and providing a system public key of thepublic/private key pair to a secure shell router at the router address.11. The system of claim 8, wherein the one or more processors arefurther configured to execute the computer-executable instructions to atleast store the nonce token in a data store, wherein the nonce tokencomprises a key sequence; and ascertaining whether the nonce token isvalid, based at least in part on searching the data store on the keysequence; and removing the nonce token from the data store after asecure shell router establishes a secure connection between the userdevice and the secure shell instance.
 12. The system of claim 8, whereinthe one or more processors are further configured to execute thecomputer-executable instructions to at least terminate the secure shellinstance following a period of inactivity or a termination of the secureconnection by the user device.
 13. The system of claim 8, wherein theone or more processors are further configured to execute thecomputer-executable instructions to at least configure the secure shellinstance, wherein configuring the secure shell instance comprises:reserving a block volume; receiving a domain identifier corresponding tothe block volume; allocating an instance on the block volume using thedomain identifier, the instance being allocated from a plurality ofavailable instances; receiving the shell identifier corresponding to theinstance; and installing a configuration file and a delegation token onthe instance, the configuration file comprising request informationincluded in the request.
 14. The system of claim 8, wherein the secureshell instance runs a docker container, such that the request comprisesan instruction to execute a terminal on the docker container.
 15. Anon-transitory computer-readable storage medium, storingcomputer-executable instructions that, when executed, cause one or moreprocessors of a computer system implementing a session manager serviceto perform operations comprising: receiving a request to create a secureshell instance; authorizing the user device, the authorizing comprising:receiving a login token comprising a user identifier from the userdevice; requesting an authorization system public key from anauthorization service; authenticating the user device based at least inpart on decrypting the login token with the authorization system publickey; requesting a delegation token from the authorization service atleast in part by providing the user identifier, a resource identifier ofa resource identified in the request, and an expiration period of therequest; and receiving the delegation token from the authorizationservice; creating the secure shell instance; and providing a signednonce token, the shell identifier, and a router address to the userdevice for connecting to the secure shell instance.
 16. Thenon-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein theauthorization service is configured to generate the delegation tokenupon authorizing access to the resource identified in the request withinthe expiration period.
 17. The non-transitory computer-readable storagemedium of claim 15, wherein the operations further comprising signingthe nonce token, and wherein signing the nonce token comprises: signingthe nonce token using a system private key of a public/private key pairheld by the session manager service; and providing a system public keyof the public/private key pair to a secure shell router at the routeraddress.
 18. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium ofclaim 15, wherein the operations further comprise: storing the noncetoken in a data store, wherein the nonce token comprises a key sequence;and ascertaining whether the nonce token is valid, based at least inpart on searching the data store on the key sequence; and removing thenonce token from the data store after a secure shell router establishesa secure connection between the user device and the secure shellinstance.
 19. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium ofclaim 15, wherein the operations further comprise terminating the secureshell instance following a period of inactivity or a termination of thesecure connection by the user device.
 20. The non-transitorycomputer-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein the secure shellinstance runs a docker container, such that the request comprises aninstruction to execute a terminal on the docker container.